

# JAMESON'S PROJECT OF COGNITIVE MAPPING

A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT

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*An aesthetic of cognitive mapping—a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system—will necessarily have to respect this now enormously complex representational dialectic [of the postmodern condition] and invent radically new forms in order to do it justice. . . . The political form of postmodernism, if there ever is any, will have as its vocation the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social as well as a spatial scale.*

Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism*

*The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation.*

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

## INTRODUCTION

Of the various terms or keywords proliferating in the fields of postmodern social and cultural theory, Fredric Jameson's *cognitive mapping* has been one of the most influential.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, however, the definition of this term has been rather sketchy, and cognitive mapping has been used to describe a number of quite different activities or concepts. In large part, this is due to Jameson's own broad usage of the term. For example, he sometimes employs it in reference to an individual's "subjective" attempt to locate her- or himself in a complex social milieu; at other times, Jameson points to a supra-

individual ("objective") production of space in the multinational, late capitalist world system. The difficulties of pinning down cognitive mapping are compounded by Jameson's own system of thought, in which multiple and even opposed elements are brought together under the power of some unifying or totalizing force (such as the dialectic, or capital itself). That is, Jameson does not hesitate to embrace disparate critical theories or practices that diverge significantly from the thesis he puts forth—such as Gilles Deleuze's "schizoanalysis"—only to reduce and incorporate them into his larger philosophical system: Jameson's own version of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*, canceling his opponents' arguments, while preserving a kernel of their ideas, and dialectically advancing his own position.

A key question of cognitive mapping that continues to be posed and debated is, "Are cartographic practices inherently liberatory or repressive?" Jameson clearly sees cognitive mapping—"a code word for [a new kind of] class consciousness" (1991, p. 418)—as a politically progressive activity. But many, including John Beverley in this volume, have criticized what they see as the hegemonic effects directly connected to mapping. Another position, one that I take to be preferable, follows Michel Foucault's and Deleuze's sense of spatial practices as strategies of power that can be used in a number of ways, both progressively and otherwise. Foucault has delineated many aspects of the spatialization of modern societies, vis-a-vis Panopticism and control over bodies. But he has also suggested that power, like Deleuze's "map," is reversible. Deleuze's nomadology, moreover, suggests a sort of mapping practice that subsumes restrictive boundaries even as it "maps" territories.<sup>2</sup>

In this chapter, I will examine Jameson's concept of cognitive mapping in terms of its usefulness as a critical practice. In the first section I will take up, as it were, the thing in itself, focusing on Jameson's (1991) arguments in *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, and attempt to arrive at a definition of cognitive mapping. In the second section, I will take up the question of mapping as a hegemonic force "bound up with domination," as John Beverley has suggested. Sometimes in direct dialogue with Jameson's cognitive mapping, at other times more generally, a number of critics have argued that the increasing emphasis on spatiality and mapping has had the effect of closing down certain, for example, subaltern perspectives, or even, as Crystal Bartolovich suggests in her discussion of multinational corporations in this volume, of establishing a novel sort of imperialism. In the third section, I will look at alternative ways of imagining a kind of cognitive mapping, especially as they are presented by Foucault and Deleuze. While Foucault never completed a work that focused on

geography, as he once suggested he would do (Foucault, 1980, p. 77), one can nevertheless see the concern for spatial relations and mapping in such books as *The Birth of the Clinic* and *Discipline and Punish*. Deleuze, following directly from Foucault, has elaborated further a theory of mapping that can be viewed as an alternative to Jameson's notion. Then, finally, and based on these examinations, I will argue that a form of cartographic practice is necessary for any pedagogical, not to say political, project that attempts to deal with the present condition. I believe that a synthesis of Jameson's project and Deleuze's somewhat Foucauldian theories can provide a useful understanding of cognitive mapping as a critical practice for social and cultural theory, one that can take certain antimapping perspectives into account while maintaining the importance of mapping to the contemporary concerns of comparative education.

In some ways, then, this chapter stands as a companion piece to Bartolovich's contribution to this volume. But whereas Bartolovich focuses her attention on the debate over the concept of "totality"—in which Jameson stands as a leading proponent and Foucault figures as the poststructuralist antagonist—I will focus on cognitive mapping as a critical practice, and leave question of totality, to a certain extent, on the back burner. I will, however, examine Bartolovich's argument more closely in the section titled "Can the Subaltern Map?", since Jameson's view of the social (now global) totality and the critiques thereof are extremely important to the critical debate surrounding cognitive mapping.

#### JAMESON'S MAPPING PROJECT

Jameson introduces the term cognitive mapping in his 1984 essay, "Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (reprinted with only slight modifications as the first chapter of his book of the same name [1991]). Not surprisingly then, this view of cognitive mapping has as its particular place of reference the historical moment of postmodernism and/or of late capitalism. Jameson begins with many descriptions of the ways in which our situation—in the global, or multinational, world economic system, the cultural and intellectual indications of the "crisis of representation" in art and (poststructuralist) theory, the combining of base and superstructure in "pop art" and consumer capitalism—is radically different from, and yet also, in a sense, linked with previous sociohistorical situations. He then proposes that older (realist or modernist) aesthetic practices are no longer suitable or even feasible, and that we need to develop an "aesthetic of cognitive mapping."<sup>3</sup>

Jameson has two main sources for this conception, one practical and one theoretical, although these cannot be long separated in Jameson's sys-

tem. The first is Kevin Lynch's study of urban space, *The Image of the City* (1960), and the second is Louis Althusser's famous essay on ideology (first published in 1970, translated in 1971). Jameson is able to bring the two texts together in the figure of cognitive mapping, and indeed, as he says later, "cognitive mapping . . . can now be characterized as something of a synthesis between Althusser and Kevin Lynch" (1991, p. 415).

Lynch's study focuses on the ways in which individuals in cities imagine their environments. His framework is fundamentally phenomenological, inasmuch as it presupposes a psychological subject who can "map" the landscape of empirical data. By way of illustration, Lynch compares (and contrasts) the ways in which subjects see and "map" Boston and Jersey City. Boston, with its familiar landmarks and borders (such as the John Hancock building and the Charles River), is a city of which one can form a mental diagram (and through which one can move) with relatively little conceptual difficulty (at least, according to Lynch). Jersey City, lacking traditional markers, presents a model of the alienated city, the space that one has trouble mapping while living in it—a *Lebenswelt* characterized, in some significant part, by confusion. From Lynch (although Lynch does not, to my knowledge, use the term), Jameson gets his first definition of cognitive mapping: It "involves the practical reconquest of a sense of place and the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in memory and which the individual can map and remap along moments of mobile, alternative trajectories" (p. 51). As Jameson quickly points out, however, Lynch's work was intended to apply to the urban experience alone, and—withstanding the ever-growing amount of work on cities and postmodernism—Jameson's argument calls for a postmodernism characterized by global, or multinational, socioeconomic relations, which would include but not be limited to those of the city. While Jameson would not discount the impact of the urban on the existential conditions of a city's inhabitants, he does want to emphasize the global vis-a-vis postmodernism over and above the urban—which is perhaps too closely tied to modernism. Jameson nevertheless feels that Lynch's model can be extended to the national or multinational without much difficulty, at least, so long as this extension occurs on the conceptual horizon. Jameson later notes, in his discussion of *Detroit: I Do Mind Dying* by Dan Georakis and Marvin Surkin (1975), that a successful city-level political program organized along the lines of local, urban experience will almost necessarily fail when it attempts to extend itself to the national or international level (1991, pp. 413–15).

Althusser provides Jameson a way to make such a conceptual extension. Using Althusser's by now well-known redefinition of ideology as "the

representation of the subject's imaginary relationship to his or her real conditions of existence," Jameson suggests that this is precisely what, in theory, the individual in the city is attempting to do in practice when engaged in cognitive mapping. Earlier, in his *The Political Unconscious* (1981), Jameson had implied the same Althusserian formula to refer to the vocation of the novel, or the literary text, as a way of symbolizing imaginary solutions to real contradictions. So, reading Jameson in reverse, one might say that literary writing is already a form of cognitive mapping.

Althusser provides a theoretical framework for Lynch's more empirical or experiential analysis of the ways in which individuals negotiate their surroundings. "Ideology" provides a bigger picture than the "image of the city," insofar as it allows for a sense of the "real" as mode of production. By "synthesizing" Althusser and Lynch, Jameson is able to expand Lynch's city-model to a more global terrain, while grounding Althusser's abstract thesis in the practical "art" (the "aesthetic") of cognitive mapping. Thus, Jameson manages to cancel and preserve the two, while presumably elevating both to a new plane.

While Jameson's text consistently refers to cognitive mapping in relation to postmodernism—and indeed, he introduces cognitive mapping as a concept and practice of and for postmodernism—he nevertheless provides historical examples of such a practice that antedate his periodization of postmodernism. In an important "digression on cartography," Jameson first mentions that Lynch's "cognitive mapping" is really precartographic, referring more to itineraries than to maps, to "diagrams organized around the still subject-centered or existential journey of the traveler, along which various significant key features are marked" (1991, pp. 51–52). Jameson compares Lynch's results to those of the sea charts of antiquity, "where coastal features are noted for the use of Mediterranean navigators who rarely venture out into the open sea" (1991, p. 52). The technology of the compass and the sextant, then, opens up a higher stage of cognitive mapping—understood in these examples in terms of maritime navigation—insofar as it adds a sense of the universal, for example, in relation to the stars, to the isolated experiential knowledge of individual mariners: "At this point, cognitive mapping in the broader sense comes to require the coordination of existential data (the empirical position of the subject) with unived, abstract conceptions of the geographic totality" (1991, p. 52). Finally, with the advent of the globe (in 1490) and the Mercator projection (a bit later), "yet a third dimension of cartography emerges," which calls forth a new crisis in representation—Jameson here refers to the "dilemma of the transfer of curved space to flat charts" (1991, p. 52). The "naively" mimetic maps no

longer work, and it becomes apparent that there can be no "true maps." Jameson further asserts that this moment represents a watershed in the history of map making, going so far as to suggest that a sort of beginning of history of cartography now comes into view: "at the same time it also becomes clear that there can be scientific progress, or better still, a dialectical advance, in the various historical moments of mapmaking" (1991, p. 52).

In addition to this very brief history of cartography, Jameson draws on Henri Lefebvre and Ernest Mandel to provide a glimpse of a history of the production (as distinguished here from the history of the representations) of space: "The three historical stages of capital have each generated a type of space unique to it, even though these three stages of capitalist space are obviously far more profoundly inter-related than are the spaces of other modes of production" (1991, p. 410). As Jameson sees it, the market space is that of the grid, and is related to the broad Enlightenment project of secularizing the world; the aesthetic form correlating to this is realism, and Jameson seems to locate the birth of the novel within this space of market capital. With the emergence of monopoly capital (and imperialism), a new sort of national space, already becoming quite international, opens up; the lived experience of, say, London no longer coincides with its own place, since the "truth" of that experience lies elsewhere, in Jamaica or India for example—that most British of traditional, daily practices, teatime, might require Indian tea and Jamaican sugar, even if the tea drinkers have no idea of those places and their histories. Jameson links this stage to modernism, although Edward Said has certainly demonstrated (in *Culture and Imperialism* [1993]) that the "overlapping territories" of the metropolitan and colonized spaces are every bit as apparent in so-called classical realist novels—that is, not just Joyce or Camus, but Austen and Dickens as well.

It is harder to detect the "quantum leap" from this form of nationalist space to the (current) postmodern space of late capitalism. Jameson does not clearly define the difference, or he suggests that there is merely a difference in degree—"If this is so for the age of imperialism, how much more it must hold for . . . 'late capitalism'" (1996, p. 412). But with the dismantling of great colonial empires (at least in their most visible forms, i.e., those of direct political control), a kind of withering away of the state has made room for a global (or multinational) space. This has been accompanied by greater (and more ominous) technologies that allow for almost instantaneous border-crossings and recrossings—such that, for example, in the time that it would take to put a stamp on a letter to France, an e-mail message has already arrived in Paris. Hence, Jameson's postmodern space involves a much greater "suppression of distance" and "saturation of space" than earlier types

had, although these terms could certainly be applied to the effects of market and monopoly capitalism as well. Jameson takes the project of cognitive mapping to be the most suitable form of epistemological, as well as political, activity for dealing with the hyper-hurly-burly of the postmodern situation. This is what Thomas Mouat, in this volume, indicates by the phrase, "the timely emergence of social cartography."<sup>4</sup>

Given Jameson's exhaustive treatment of how postmodernism is defined by a crisis in representability, it may seem that the call for a critical practice of cognitive mapping is romantic at best, or even simply naive. Jameson has admitted that cognitive mapping is a "modernist strategy," and thus he implies that it may not necessarily be best suited for the present historical situation. In the next sections I will look at other ways of imagining a sort of critical mapping, but before moving on, I want to make sure that I have at least put forth (or taken from Jameson) a provisional definition of cognitive mapping. Given its apparent scope, the breadth of its possible usages, it might be best to imagine cognitive mapping in terms of Jameson's thinking in general, rather than in terms of his analysis of postmodernism alone. For, as we have seen, one of the paradoxes of Jameson's conception is that he locates cognitive mapping firmly within postmodern sensibilities at times, and, at others, he seems to suggest that cognitive mapping is an almost perennial human activity (as with the ancient itineraries and sea charts).

Colin MacCabe, in his preface to *The Geopolitical Aesthetic* (1992), has offered one very good characterization, if not strict definition, of cognitive mapping in terms of Jameson's project over the last fifteen years or so. MacCabe sees it as providing the psychology that was lacking in the concept of the political unconscious: "What Jameson requires is an account of the mechanisms which articulate individual fantasy and social organization" (p. xii). The "political unconscious" provides Jameson a key theoretical term, and "postmodernism," a key historical category (p. xii); but, as MacCabe tells us, "cognitive mapping" is the most crucial element of Jameson's philosophical system: "Crucial because it is the missing psychology of the political unconscious, the political edge of the historical analysis of Postmodernism, and the methodological justification of the Jamesonian undertaking" (p. xiv).

What allows MacCabe to say this is the essence of Jameson's nearly lifelong project, the question central to nearly all of his work: How does the psychically enclosed, subjective individual relate to the socially dispersed, objective totality? This question is put again and again, in a variety of forms—How does the apparently asocial and ahistorical, but very psychological, modernism reflect, represent or just come to grips with the sociohistorical? How do the private fantasies of one discrete individual sub-

ject point to the broad, intersubjective political realities? How does one map a totality?—but it comes back (in equally various forms) to an answer that Jameson, drawing from not only Althusser but a host of thinkers and writers also, consistently submits: There are something like imaginary solutions to real contradictions that are forever sought (or produced) by individuals in order to deal with the ever more refined and nuanced disjunctions or fragmentations in their daily lives. Jameson has admitted, for instance, that “‘cognitive mapping’ was [although “is” would seem more appropriate] in reality nothing but a code word for ‘class consciousness’” (1991, p. 418), albeit a class consciousness suitable for our global situation with its inherent spatiality. Further, Jameson has since defended his conception of cognitive mapping, by asserting that the “idea has, at least on my view, the advantage of involving concrete content (imperialism, the world system, subalterity, dependency and hegemony), while necessarily involving a program of formal analysis of a new kind (since it is centrally defined by the dilemma of representation itself)” (1992, pp. 188–89). While a revised understanding of the term “class consciousness” might have sufficed, “cognitive mapping” more explicitly brings these elements to the fore.

Hence the literary category that has preoccupied Jameson’s thinking, at least since *Marxism and Form* (1971), of allegory: essentially, one story which tells another—for example, a favorite of Jameson’s, the narrative of an individual psychological subject which tells the story of great sociohistorical conditions. A cognitive map is also such an allegory, for just as there can be no “true map” (one that purely represents the geographic space) neither can the cognitive map be the true (perfectly mimetic) representation of “the Real,” but rather an allegorical structure that attempts to “tell” another spatial tale. Cognitive mapping augments the political unconscious by providing a clearer link between the psychological and the social, and Jameson has, I think, linked the two key terms together in a new term (which has not yet gained, if it will at all, the cachet of these others), the *geopolitical unconscious*, where the “geo-” prefix lends the earlier book-title term a sense of that spatiality so important for Jameson’s more recent thought. “Space, representability, allegory,” then, are not just the points of reference for *The Geopolitical Aesthetic* (as he says in his introduction [1992, p. 5]), but for Jameson’s entire project over more than twenty-five years, a project that can now perhaps be called, simply, “cognitive mapping.”

#### CAN THE SUBALTERN MAP?

Jameson’s concept, or project, of cognitive mapping has elicited a great deal of spirited criticism. For example, as Bartolovich’s analysis (in the present

volume) demonstrates, Jameson's insistence on comprehending, and mapping, the social totality has drawn fire from a generation of critics who, following poststructuralist interventions, take any notion of totality to be both an impossible and, indeed, an undesirable dream. Jameson has said that cognitive mapping is centrally defined by a crisis in representability, and the question of representation remains central to Jameson's antagonists as well. Representation not only causes trouble in regard to totality—How can one represent a totality?—but also in terms of who is doing the representing and who is being represented.

John Beverley's contribution to this book begins by asking the question, "Are maps inevitably bound up with domination?" While Beverley's essay is not specifically on this question, it does contain an underlying polemic against mapping, cognitive or otherwise. Beverley's fundamental objection involves the representation of the subaltern—in this case, primarily, Latino and Latin American people—in the age of multinational capitalism. According to this argument, cognitive mapping becomes another, albeit well-intended, attempt to represent the subaltern in such a way as to take away any self-representational authority from them. Following Spivak—who paradoxically holds that subalterns cannot "speak," insofar as their speech cannot (as Beverley puts it in this volume) "carry any sort of authority or meaning for us [who are presumably non-subaltern] without altering the relations of power/knowledge that constitute it as subaltern in the first place." Beverley suggests that studying, or mapping, the subaltern is "self-contradictory," insofar as it involves the acknowledgment that the subject itself (the subaltern) resists representation. Thus cognitive mapping, which Beverley also sees as firmly within the scope of Western, privileged academic discourse, fails, since it involves representing the unrepresentable. Beverley sees as the goal of subaltern studies not representing the subaltern, but registering the ways that such representation is impossible, and in so doing, offering a critique of the very institutions of "academic knowledge," or, as Beverley concludes, exploring "the possibility of a new kind of politics."

Of course, however academic in approach, Jameson is thoroughly aware of the inability to faithfully represent the subaltern or anything else. As Bartolovich points out in this volume, Jameson uses the term *figuration*, "which does not imply a faithful mimetic copying of a pre-existent reality but simply an attempt to come to terms with 'the real' in all its complexity, even though that 'real' will always remain an 'absent cause' for which any representation is necessarily inadequate." Nevertheless, for Bartolovich, Jameson's examples seem to indicate something more like representational thinking. Her main complaint with Jameson's project lies in his adherence

to a theory of totality that, Bartolovich argues, excludes or at least marginalizes certain (subaltern) groups. In the example mentioned above, regarding the space of monopoly capital, Jameson describes how the "structural coordinates" of a Londoner's daily lived experience no longer coincide with the space of that city, but encompass India or Jamaica as well. Bartolovich points out that those Indian or Jamaican subjects would perhaps not find the figuration of an integrated totality quite so liberatory.

Bartolovich, like me but with her different emphasis on the theory of totality, turns to Foucault for an alternative to Jameson's system. But Foucault "represents" (her word) the other extreme: Whereas Jameson calls for a somewhat utopian totality, Foucault's theory of power—which holds that power is always decentered, not located in any particular place—seems to allow no grounds for resistance to gain purchase, and takes any totalized vision (utopian or not) to be merely a substitution of one form of domination for another.

The figure for this totalizing vision is, for Bartolovich, the map itself. She suggests that the itinerary, rather than the map, provides the better figure, or metaphor, since the itinerary is grounded in the actual "mapping/mapped subjects in 'lines' produced by their collective movements under specific conditions." In a sense, then, Bartolovich seems to favor a return to Kevin Lynch's type of mapping—which, as I noted above, Jameson concedes is really precartographic—but Bartolovich has extended this beyond urban space alone. She sees the map as something with "stable lines and settled relations," whereas the itinerary "represents" something more like the activity of traveling. I do not, however, take the map to be, in any fundamental way, stable or settled, and in the next section, I address this issue in relation to Deleuze's work.

There is now quite an impressive bibliography of work dealing with the relations, historical and theoretical, between cartography and imperialism. Undoubtedly, European cartographic techniques advanced dramatically after the discovery of the New World, and these continued to be refined in the centuries of imperial expansion that followed. Benedict Anderson, following Foucault's methods, has argued that the development of mapping Southeast Asia and Africa had an enormous and facilitating impact on the Western colonization of those regions, not just in terms of direct political control, but also with regard to the production of knowledge in and about those areas (1991, especially pp. 170–78). And Timothy Mitchell (1988), also somewhat Foucauldianly, has asserted that the surveying of Egypt in the eighteenth century helped to make possible new techniques of surveillance both in the colony and in the metropolitan center—in fact, Mitchell

notes that Bentham's famous panopticon principle was initially derived from his brother's regulatory treatment of colonial workers.

The passing of what Lenin called "the age of imperialism," the world-historical moment that (according to Jameson) precedes our "postmodern condition," has not entailed any concomitant waning of cartographic practices. On the contrary, as Jameson insists repeatedly, and to which Mouat in this volume and others testify with ever greater urgency, the spatialization of societies and the need for a kind of spatial analysis have never been more intense. The tendency of capital towards globalization, which Marx described in the *Grundrisse*, is today being celebrated or attacked as a fait accompli by many, while others at least acknowledge that the tendency is still there. Some multinational corporations now figure as greater economic entities than many powerful so-called first world states. And Bartolovich, in this volume, has noticed the ominous enthusiasm that their advertising agents seem to have for maps. She notes that maps and globes are "among the most common types of cover design employed by contemporary corporations in their annual reports," and she describes a well-published Ford advertisement that depicts a world map with its corporate logo superimposed over many land masses. Furthermore, popular among the visual maps used in advertising and annual reports are those "antique" sixteenth century maps with their quite explicit relations to explorers, discovery and colonization. Bartolovich suggests that multinational corporations are involved in representing themselves as the new colonial powers, now that, for the most part, direct imperialist control by one nation over another has withered away.

David Turnbull, also in this volume, notes that while the increased spatialization in modern societies and the growing centrality of cartography have benefited dominant economic and political forces, those who are "subaltern" nevertheless can, and do, use maps and mapping as a counter-hegemonic practice (as in the case of the Inuit remapping of official government maps).<sup>5</sup> Whereas Beverley seems to deny any possibility of using maps for political resistance—since the representational form itself is suspect—Bartolovich and Turnbull see the need for cartographically based resistance precisely because maps have come to be the dominant form of representation. For Bartolovich and Turnbull, mapping has to be useful as a counterpractice, even as it must necessarily implicate itself in the representation problems of cartography.

#### CARTOGRAPHIES OF POWER: FOUCAULT AND DELEUZE

Because so many critics of the politics of mapping, and of Jameson's cognitive mapping, derive their methods, theories or just inspiration from

Foucault's work, I will now turn to Foucault and examine what I take to be his contribution to these debates. An interesting aspect of the Foucault phenomenon is that, while Foucault enables through his historical analyses a number of antimapping positions, Foucault is not himself opposed to mapping. In fact, I contend that Foucault—in addition to, Deleuze—actually puts forth a conception of social mapping as a useful tool for critical inquiry.

Foucault has shown, in his archaeological and genealogical works, how modern societies have become increasingly spatialized. This spatialization has not only to do with geographic analysis, but with issues of demography, medicine, urban and regional planning and education. Foucault's work has fascinating resonances with Jameson's history of spatial formations, especially if one takes into account Deleuze's discussion of Foucault's "diagram" (1988, pp. 24–44). Foucault's cartography of power is not absolutely inconsistent with the historical mapping of the production of space in Jameson, but their methods and goals are quite different. Foucault lacks Jameson's sense of a dialectical movement of capital, but he does not at all dismiss the power relations that are in turn connected with (and even encompass) relations to the mode of production (labor, wage, monetary, and so on). It seems that despite Jameson's polemics—for example, he has called Foucault's power a "shadowy and mythical entity" (1991, p. 410)—Foucault's work can be used in connection with a type of cognitive mapping, for, in addition to those "diagrams" discussed in *Discipline and Punish* (and especially in the chapter on Panopticism), Foucault has discussed the emergence of an increasingly spatialized society—in shorthand, the modern. This spatialization not only appears in the direct sort of geographic boundary-drawing (as in the "strict spatial partitioning" in order to combat the plague), but also in the general ordering of demographic, economic and medical data (elaborated in *Birth of the Clinic*), such that a key feature of Foucault's "modern" society is the scientific distribution and codification of individuals in space. The importance given to *le regard* (as an almost technical term) in both of these books can be attributed to the fact that "the gaze"—broadly conceived as not only direct observation, but also that collecting and ordering of information—is the practical model of this spatial distribution. Turnbull's analysis in this volume resonates with Foucault's inasmuch as the emergence of modern cartography, science and the state are shown to be deeply interrelated and roughly contemporaneous.

As early as in *Madness and Civilization* (originally published in 1961, translated into English in 1965), Foucault had described the emergence of a society administered in terms of the organization and registration of individuals in a spatial array. In this work, Foucault focuses on the birth of the

asylum—from the premodern exile of madmen with its haunting images of a ship of fools to what Foucault calls the “great confinement”—and so he deals with a centralization of the power to classify and “place” individuals in a certain recognizable group (the insane) and in a particular location (in this case the Hôpital Général). Foucault points out that the great confinement is contemporaneous with developments in capitalist production, such that asylums housed not only the insane, but the poor and “idle” as well—in fact, the distinction was not foregrounded, since a sign of moral and mental infirmity was idleness. This is the point at which Foucault also locates the urbanization of society, such that, for the French,<sup>6</sup> urban planning, surveillance and mapping become the model of national social organization as a whole.

In what might be called a fascinating ruse of history, one today sees not the forced confinement of the poor and idle, but the voluntary confinement *sought* by many wealthy and middle-class people in “new walled communities.” As Dennis Judd (1995) has noted, such communities often are promoted with a rhetoric of grassroots, participatory democracy—the homeowners are all involved, sometimes necessarily and contractually, in the “local” governance of the community—while at the same time the community is sustained by rather authoritarian means (including strict codes concerning lawn care, number of children and pets and so on). Also, the public space of the market, the enclosed shopping malls, have further isolated and confined even that most “free” space where Adam Smith had seen no authoritative force operating other than the “invisible hand.” Ironically, the most “poor and idle,” the homeless, are not confined, but, on the contrary, left to the spaces outside of these “asylums.”

By his next book, *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963, translated into English in 1973), still long before he had developed his theory of power characterized by its capillary and decentralized nature, Foucault already began to move away from the model of intense centralization. To be sure, medical practices and the knowledge to be gained by them were undoubtedly being centralized in the form of the state, but here Foucault notes the degree to which the spatial organization of individuals in society has less to do with confinement than with distribution. Individuals will be located, monitored and subject to registration, but without necessarily sequestering them in a particular location. The gaze is no longer limited to a particular place in which it operates but is generalized to cover the whole social field. Foucault’s “archaeology of the medical gaze” (the book’s subtitle) already points to his later genealogy of disciplinary practices, *Discipline and Punish* (1975, translated into English in 1977), which Deleuze would characterize as a cartography of power.

The famous chapter entitled “Panopticism” opens with a description

of the organization of the plague-stricken city, thus recalling the arguments on madness and medicine from Foucault's earlier studies. Strict spatial partitioning, constant surveillance, individualizing distributions and the intensification of power typify the social organization of the plague-stricken town, which, Foucault claims, "is the utopia of the perfectly governed city" (1977, p. 198). Foucault takes this model in its instrumentality to be identical to that of Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*, an architectural apparatus in which those inside it can be assured of the possibility of always being seen, that is, of being located within a well-regulated matrix. Even more than in his earlier books, Foucault here takes spatial relations to be fundamental to the organization of society through the functioning of power. The Panopticon

is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form . . . It is a type of localization of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centers and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons. (1977, p. 205)

Deleuze takes this to be the most important achievement of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*: isolating and describing the diagram. The generalization of the panoptic diagram beyond merely architectural applications constitutes a new form of the social organization of space. As Deleuze writes, "the diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field" (1988, p. 34). Unlike Jameson's version of the production of space, Deleuze's Foucauldian analysis focuses not on capital as the organizing power, but on power itself.

We have seen that the relations between forces, or power relations, were microphysical, strategic, multipunctual and diffuse, that they determined particular features and constituted pure functions. The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of density, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relations and at every moment passes through every point, "or rather in every relation from one point to another." (1988, p. 36, translation modified)

While Deleuze's analysis remains rather abstract, his reading of Foucault establishes the strict spatiality of power-relations in modern, disciplinary societies.

Deleuze, in his collaborative work with Félix Guattari, has supplemented this idea of the diagram with his later "nomadology."<sup>7</sup> Deleuze draws a distinction between nomads—who are understood not only by their border crossings and recrossings, but by their conceptual demolition of boundary lines themselves—and the state and "State philosophy," which are defined in terms of sedentary ordering and segmenting of the rank and file. By their deconstruction of boundaries, the nomads do not necessarily oppose mapping; on the contrary, they continually map and remap.<sup>7</sup> They are, in Deleuzian language, forces of "deterritorialization," upsetting to a greater or lesser degree the order of the state.<sup>8</sup>

Deleuze further proposes that nomads have a qualitatively different kind of space than that of the state: "It is the difference between a *smooth* (vectoral, projective, or topological) space and a *striated* (metric) space: in the first case 'space is occupied without being counted,' and in the second case 'space is counted in order to be occupied'" (1987, pp. 361–62). For Deleuze and Guattari, the maritime model (as in Jameson's digression on cartography) provides an example of this distinction, for "the sea is a smooth space par excellence, and yet it was the first to encounter the demands of increasingly strict striation" (p. 479). Developments in cartographic techniques are partly responsible for such striation. For example, the Mercator projection, which establishes a grid composed of parallels, is perhaps the most obvious striating strategy—the smooth surface of the sea becomes a grid in which navigations between points are charted. However, we must not think that, because of this striating cartographic technique, Deleuze is somehow opposed to mapping. While Deleuze, often abstractly, provides a number of binaries such as these (for example, molecular/molar, rhizome/tree, map/trace), Deleuze also insists upon heeding Spinoza's caveat, *non opposita sed diversa* ("not opposite, but different"). For, as Deleuze states, "smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries. Never believe that smooth space will suffice to save us" (p. 500).

Foucault's seemingly total, Orwellian vision of the panoptic organization of society is in fact no more total than Deleuze's state philosophy or striated space. True, Foucault does not allow for an "outside" of power, but at least this does not mean that there is nothing outside of oppression. For Foucault, power is productive—undoubtedly producing unpleasant things, but not exclusively so—and capillary, flowing through the social body. Nevertheless, this power is not unilinearly directed, by a particular class or a state, against subaltern groups or individuals. Deleuze's nomad provides one

figure of a sort of resistance, a resistance that is not exterior to relations of power, but that exerts a force within their web.

#### CONCLUSION: CARTOGRAPHICS

I have suggested the term “cartographics” as the name for a set of critical practices that would engage with issues of space and spatial relations in connection with cultural and social theory. Cartographics has the advantage of situating “mapping” and spatial analysis firmly within the framework of these other broad fields of study, while remaining pliable enough to fit situations that are not properly in the domain of geographic inquiry. For example, cartographics would have to take into account the cultural forms that serve to map the terrain of an increasingly spatialized world view, including but not limited to the maps themselves. I believe that Jameson’s idea of cognitive mapping is already a significant contribution to this sort of critical work.

It should be clear that the concept or practice of cognitive mapping as understood by Jameson’s first definition (or characterization), drawn mainly from Lynch—where it is limited to a phenomenological sense—is not entirely appropriate for the critical project of cartographics, since the limited viewpoint of the itinerant subject cannot encompass the immense and multifaceted spatialized society. But Jameson does say that he takes Lynch’s spatial analysis as emblematic or allegorical, where the “mapping,” while obviously indicating the spatial, must also map the social (including not only geography, but education, political economy, media theory and others). Jameson also concedes that the cognitive map probably fails for the same reason that the “physical” maps fail—there can be no true maps—but he quickly adds that the inability to map (whether the results are “true” or not) is politically crippling, and thus cognitive mapping is still an integral part of any (Jameson adds “socialist”) political project (1991, pp. 415–16). Jameson takes heart in the fact that many artists, who—notwithstanding many other critiques including a number from so-called third world or formerly colonized countries—have employed something like cognitive mapping, making the vocation of art itself “that of inventing new geotopical cartographies” (1992, p. 189).

By *cartographics*, I mean to indicate a sort of synthesis between the Jamesonian and the Deleuzian/Foucauldian projects. A project of cartographics would have to take into account the ways in which spatial practices—including, of course, geographical mapping, but also knowledge production, ethnography, economics and so on—are employed, both to repressive ends (as with neo-imperialism) and as a means to a kind of liberation (as Jameson

would have it). In other words, to speak Foucauldianly, one should analyze the effects of such practices. I believe that mapping, understood broadly in terms of these manifold power/knowledge relations, presents the educator and critic with an important tool for social and cultural critical theory.<sup>9</sup>

#### NOTES

1. Cognitive mapping is not, of course, exclusively a Jamesonian term. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will focus only on cognitive mapping as Jameson uses it, and on the critical problems with his usage.

2. While the "Nomadology" appears as a chapter or "plateau" of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), for the most part I refer to Deleuze alone throughout. This is not to suggest that Guattari's contribution to Deleuze's project is negligible, but rather that the project is Deleuze's. Deleuze, prior to meeting Guattari, had already begun to write of nomads and "nomadic distribution" in *Difference and Repetition* (1968, English translation 1994). New York: Columbia University Press.

3. Aesthetic, in this case, means not only a theoretical practice in relation to art, but also a way of seeing.

4. While Mouat's thesis is, like Jameson's project, based in a kind of dialectical movement of history, Jameson would probably consider it bizarrely millenarian, particularly since Mouat does not, as Jameson feels one must, ground his historical argument in terms of mode of production. Furthermore, Mouat's appendix seems to call for a kind of Second Coming, insofar as Christ is depicted as the individual who exceeds the limits of his social milieu by "fourth-level thinking."

5. Turnbull lists a number of examples of "cartographic resistance." The Inuit, for instance, "have resisted by taking government survey maps," removing the grid and scale and naming all of the significant points with Inuit names and then publishing it as the official Inuit map. Of course, Beverley might argue that this is a rather naive way of imagining resistance, since it involves merely substituting one name for another, and thus does not even approach the heart of the matter—that is, the power of maps and mapping. Foucault, for example, might take this to be a false form of resistance, like the prisoners who would take to the observation tower and fix their gaze on the wardens; the relations of power, in these cases, would not be altered.

6. Foucault's findings are often all too easily generalized to cover the "modern world," well beyond the situatedness, in France, of most of Foucault's historical research. Foucault has for the most part limited his research to French institutions, and many scholars, even those who are sympathetic to Foucault's work, have criticized Foucault's Eurocentrism (see, for example, Mitchell, 1988).

7. The chapter on *Discipline and Punish* in *Foucault* (1988) was originally published as a review essay in 1975. Thus the "Nomadology" section of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) represents later work.

8. It should be clear that Deleuze is not really referring to actual nomadic peoples, but rather to a certain conceptual organization of forces in space. For example, Deleuze cites Lucretius's Epicurean physics as an example of nomad science, as opposed to the "royal," Aristotelian science. Earlier, Deleuze (1977) had named Nietzsche as the perhaps paradigmatic "nomad thinker."

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